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Three Types of Regress  
According to Peter Klein, infinitism is the correct solution to the regress problem.2 The problem 
arises when we consider an inferentially justified belief, B1, and ask how its justification comes 
about. Since B1 is inferentially justified, it received its justification from another belief, B2. But 
only justified beliefs can transmit justification via inference to other beliefs. So, if B1 receives its 
justification from B2, then B2 is justified in turn. Unless B2 is justified non-inferentially, its 
justification comes from a third belief, B3. Unless B3 is justified non-inferentially, its justification 
comes from a still further belief, and so forth. About the chain of beliefs on which B1’s 
justification rests, there are the following options:  
(i) it terminates in an unjustified belief; 
(ii) it terminates in a non-inferentially justified belief; 
(iii) forming a circle, it loops back to B1; 
(iv) it continues ad infinitum.  
Each of these options is puzzling: (i) because it seems impossible for a belief’s justification to 
come ultimately come from an unjustified belief; (ii) because non-inferential justification is 
mysterious; (iii) because it seems impossible that a belief can receive its justification ultimately 
from itself, even if there are many intermediate links, and (iv) because it’s hard to see how finite 
minds cannot help themselves to infinite chains of reasons. The problem is that, if indeed each 
of options (i)-(iv) is unacceptable, then the allegedly justified belief we started out with turns out 
to be unjustified.  
Deservedly, option (i) has received little support, if any. Foundationalists recommend option 
(ii) and coherentists option (iii). Klein defends infinitism on the ground that neither 
foundationalism nor coherentism can solve the regress problem. I will focus on Klein’s rejection 
of foundationalism and argue that it doesn’t succeed. I will also argue in favor of a certain kind 
of infinitism. Initially, it seems that foundationalism and infinitism are incompatible. However, 
the appearance of incompatibility disappears when we recognize that there are three different 
types of regress. The correct response to one of them need not be the correct response to the 
other ones. First, there is the doxastic regress: it consists solely of an initial, inferentially justified 
belief B1 and the further beliefs, B2 . . . Bn, from which B1 is inferred. Here is an example of a two-
step doxastic regress:  
B1 The dog ate my cookie.  
B2-4 The dog is on the couch & looks guilty & my cookie is gone. 
Beliefs B2-B4 are the premise beliefs from which B1 is inferred. The regress is doxastic because it 
consists solely of beliefs  
 
1 In Themes from Klein, edited by Branden Fitelson, Rodrigo Borges, and Cherie Braden. Springer: Synthese 
Library Volume 404: pp. 235-257.  
2 See Klein 1999, 2010, 2014a and 2014b. See also Ginet 2014a and 2014b.  
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Second, there is what we may call the evidential regress. If we reject the circle-of-beliefs 
thesis and agree that beliefs are not the only things that can be reasons or evidence, then we 
will allow for two kinds of reasons: doxastic and non-doxastic.3 Non-doxastic reasons are 
perceptual, introspective, memorial, and intuitional experiences or seemings.4 The example of a 
doxastic regress above turns into an evidential regress when we add the perceptual experiences 
that may be viewed as the reasons that justify beliefs 2-4: 
E1-3 Visual experiences with the content that the dog is on the couch, looks guilty, and 
that the plate that had my cookie on it is now empty.   
Unlike the previous doxastic regress, this enlarged regress includes both beliefs and visual 
experiences.  
Finally, there is what we may call the argumentative regress. Whereas an evidential regress 
consists of a series of reasons a subject has, an argumentative regress is made up of reasons a 
subject gives to defend a belief that’s been challenged. Obviously, in ordinary cases, there is 
nothing argumentative about the other two types of regress, which merely trace where, 
whenever a belief is justified, its justification comes from. An argumentative regress arises only 
when a subject engages in a certain social activity—that of giving reasons—in response to a 
request for providing a justification. I will argue that, whereas foundationalism is correct about 
the doxastic and the evidential regress, infinitism is correct about the argumentative regress.5 
 
Basic Beliefs  
To assess whether foundationalism is a successful solution to any of the three regress types 
mentioned above, we had better take a closer look at what kind of a view foundationalism is 
supposed to be. Here is a textbook version of it. According to foundationalism, all inferentially 
justified beliefs owe their justification to a foundation of basic beliefs that receive their 
justification not from any further beliefs but instead from experiences.6 According to 
foundationalism thus understood—experiential foundationalism, as we might call it—basic 
beliefs can be defined as follows:  
A belief B is basic iff (i) B is justified; (ii) B does not depend for its justification on any 
other beliefs.7 
 
3 See Davidson 1983, p. 426. Davidson claims that “nothing can count as a reason for holding a belief 
except another belief. Its partisan rejects as unintelligible the request for a ground or source of justification 
of another ilk.” For discussion, see Pryor 2014, p. 206ff, and Steup 1996, p. 140f.   
4 An experience or seeming that p is a reason for believing that p because it has the same content as the 
belief, namely p, and because it asserts its content assertively, as compared with, for example, imagining 
that p or wishing that p. See Huemer 2001, p. 99f. Why think that experiences can terminate the regress? 
They can do so because they can confer justification without needing any justification themselves. See 
Steup 1996, chapter 7.  
5 The distinction between the doxastic and the evidential regress on the one hand, and the argumentative 
regress on the other hand, is closely related to Alston’s distinction between a belief’s property of being 
justified and the activity of justifying a belief. See Alston 1989, p. 82.  
6 For examples of this type of view, see Audi 1993, Chisholm 1966, Feldman 2003, p. 70ff, Pollock 1986 
chapter 2, Huemer 2001 chapter 5, and Pryor 2000. For a recent collection of essays discussing experiential 
foundationalism, see Tucker 2013.  
7 Feldman 2003, p. 50, defines basic beliefs as beliefs that are “justified but . . . not on the basis of any other 
beliefs.” 
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Advocates of experiential foundationalism must explain how it’s possible for an experience to 
justify a belief. I will address this issue further below. They must also respond to Laurence 
BonJour’s well-known argument for the conclusion that there aren’t any basic beliefs.8 Since this 
argument is closely related to Klein’s argument for infinitism, it will be fruitful to examine it. I will 
follow Richard Feldman’s clear presentation of it, and I will also follow Klein in introducing a 
scenario involving two protagonists: foundationalist Fred and Doris the doubter.9 Fred, let us 
suppose, believes 
BATE IT The dog ate my cookie.  
Doris challenges Fred to explain why he thinks that BATE IT is justified. Fred responds by saying 
that he inferred BATE IT from three other propositions he believes: the dog is on the couch, looks 
guilty, and the plate that had his cookie on it is now empty. Suppose Doris selects the first of 
these beliefs for further questioning and asks Fred why he thinks that 
BDOG The dog is on the couch,  
is justified.10 He replies that BDOG is basic; it is justified not by further beliefs but instead solely 
by: 
EDog A visual experience with the content that the dog is on the couch. 
At this point, BonJour’s argument against basic beliefs kicks in. The key thought of his argument 
is that it’s not possible for EDog by itself to justify BDOG. A justificatory contribution from further 
beliefs is needed.  
 
BonJour’s Argument Against Basic Beliefs 
BonJour’s argument can be construed a sequence of two arguments. The first rests on the 
thought that, from the point of view of the subject, justification must be a path to truth: a belief 
is justified if, and only if, given what the subject has to go on, the belief is probably true (i.e. the 
probability of its being true is greater than .5).11 So, if Fred claims that BDOG is justified in the 
basic way—that is, without owing its justification to any other beliefs—he must argue that BDOG 
has a certain truth-indicative property, P, by virtue of which this belief is probably true. The 
pattern for such an argument is as follows: 
The TIP Argument 
(1) BDOG has a truth-indicative property P.  
(2) Beliefs having property P are probably true.  
Therefore: 
(3) BDOG is probably true.  
The second argument is based on the thought that, since justification is supposed to be a path 
to truth, having a justified belief requires having a TIP argument. A TIP argument provides what 
 
8 See BonJour 1985, p. 30f.  
9 See Feldman 2003, p. 75f and Klein 2014a, p. 276. 
10 Of course, she could instead have chosen one of the other two premise beliefs, or asked Fred to justify 
all three. I’ll focus on BDOG, which is why I didn’t introduce ‘BGUILTY’ and ‘BEMPTY’ as names for Fred’s other 
two premise beliefs. 
11 See BonJour 1985, p. 8. BonJour says that a justified belief is one that is highly likely true, but this claim 
conflicts with the rather basic point that justification comes in degrees, which is to say that a belief can be 
justified—albeit to a low degree—if the subject’s reasons make it somewhat likely that it is true.  
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we may call a ‘meta-justification’. Fred tells Doris the reason that justifies BDOG is EDOG. At this 
point, as Klein puts it, Doris goes meta and ask Fred why he thinks that EDOG is a reason for 
BDOG.12 In response, Fred might argue that EDOG has the property of being a clear and vivid visual 
experience, and beliefs based on experiences having that property are probably true. According 
to BonJour’s argument, if Fred provides such a meta-justification for his claim that a is EDOG 
reason for BDOG, he admits that BDOG is in fact not basic. BonJour’s second argument, then, runs 
thus:  
BonJour’s Meta-Justification Argument Against Basic Beliefs 
(4) All justification requires having a TIP argument.  
(5) If (4) is true, then BDOG is not basic.  
Therefore: 
(6) BDOG is not basic. 
Since BonJour’s meta-justification argument can be applied to any putatively basic belief, we get 
the general conclusion that basic beliefs are impossible. The key thought on which BonJour’s 
argument is based is what we may call:  
The Principle of Meta-Justification  
There is no justification without meta-justification.  
Klein, too, endorses the principle of meta-justification, though not in quite the same way as 
BonJour does. Next, I’ll turn to Klein’s rejection of foundationalism, and then I’ll defend 
foundationalism against both BonJour and Klein.  
 
Klein’s Rejection of Foundationalism  
Klein bases his rejection of foundationalism on the dialectic that ensues in the dialogue between 
Doris and Fred. Essentially, his argument mirrors BonJour’s: when Doris goes meta, Fred must 
accede to her demand for meta-justification and therefore give up his claim that BDOG is basic, 
thus abandoning foundationalism.13 Doris goes meta when Fred asserts that EDOG is a reason for 
BDOG. She asks Fred why he thinks that basing BDOG on EDOG is truth-conducive. In other words, 
she wants to know from Fred whether EDOG has a property that makes it probable that B is true. 
As an experiential foundationalist, Fred will answer Doris’s question by offering the following 
meta-justification: 
MJ EDOG has the property of being a clear and vivid visual experience, and beliefs 
based on such experiences are probably true.14 
In response to Doris’s request for a meta-justification, Klein says, Fred faces a trilemma. He has 
three options: (i) assert MJ, (ii) deny MJ, and (iii) suspend judgment about MJ. Options (ii) and 
(iii) are bad. If Fred were to exercise either one of them, he would in effect be saying that he 
takes EDOG to be a reason for BDOG although he has no justification at all for thinking that basing 
 
12 See Klein 2014a, p. 277. 
13 Klein 2014a, p. 276f. 
14 Like BonJour, Klein argues that, if a belief is basic, it must have a special property because of which it is 
likely to be true. See Klein 2014a, p. 276f. He does not, however, focus on a specific instance of that 
property. In exploring what transpires when Fred responds to Doris request for meta-justification, I let Fred 
respond as I think he should, namely by offering what I consider a plausible candidate for the special 
property in question: EDOG’s being a visual experience that is clear and vivid. 
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BDOG on EDOG is truth-conducive. That looks like a break-down of epistemic rationality. Hence 
Klein dismisses options (ii) and (iii), taking them to induce a kind of arbitrariness that’s 
incompatible with the assumption that BDOG is indeed a justified belief. I think Klein is clearly 
right about that. 
So, unless Fred is prepared to abandon his claim that EDOG is his reason for BDOG, he had 
better exercise option (i) and assert MJ. However, Klein argues, if Fred exercises option (i), he 
must then retract his claim that BDOG is basic. Next, I will argue that neither BonJour’s nor Klein’s 
attempted refutation of foundationalism succeeds.  
 
Foundationalism Defended 
As I mentioned above, BonJour’s anti-foundationalist argument is based on the principle of 
meta-justification: there is no justification without meta-justification. It’s important to see that 
there are two ways to understand this principle. The first is doxastic, and that’s the reading 
BonJour has in mind:  
The Principle of Doxastic Meta-Justification (DMJ)  
There is no justification without beliefs providing meta-justification.  
If DMJ is true, then basic beliefs are indeed impossible. Hence, to defend foundationalism at 
BonJour’s argument, DMJ must be rejected. And rejecting it is well-advised since DMJ is a recipe 
for radical skepticism. First, since meta-justificatory beliefs must themselves be justified, it 
generates the consequence that justification requires an infinite number of beliefs.15 Second, in 
ordinary situations, people just don’t have any meta-justificatory beliefs.16 So, if DMJ were true, 
then ordinary perceptual beliefs would be unjustified. That is why BonJour’s argument doesn’t 
amount to a plausible challenge to foundationalists. Consider the first premise of his argument:  
(4) All justification requires having a TIP argument.  
BonJour insists on the following strong reading of (4): 
(4a) All justification requires believing the premises of a TIP argument.   
If (4) must be understood as (4a), then 
(5) If (4a) is true, then BDOG is not basic.  
is clearly true. However, for the reasons mentioned above, (4a) is not plausible.17 Now, it might 
be thought that, when foundationalists reject (4a), they must insist that justification does not 
require meta-justification in any form. But that thought would be a mistake. There is an 
interpretation of the principle of meta-justification that allows for the existence of basic beliefs, 
namely:  
The Principle of Evidential Meta-Justification (EMJ)  
There is no justification without evidence providing meta-justification.  
Accordingly, (4) can be read alternatively as:  
(4b) All justification requires evidence for the premises of a TIP argument.   
If premise (4) is understood as (4b), the next premise must be: 
 
15 For the infinite mind objection, see Audi 1993, pp. 127-128, Huemer’s essay in this volume, and Klein 
2014a, p. 281. 
16 See Ginet 2014a, p. 287.  
17 See Feldman 2003, p. 77.  
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(5b) If (4b) is true, then BDOG is not basic.  
But (5b) is false. If the needed evidence for the TIP argument comes solely in the form of 
perceptual, introspective, memorial, and intuitional experiences, Fred’s meta-justification for 
BDOG doesn’t involve any beliefs and thus is compatible with BDOG’s being basic. EMJ, therefore, 
poses no threat to the foundationalist claim that inferentially justified beliefs receive their 
justification ultimately from basic beliefs.  
Next, I will respond to Klein’s rejection of foundationalism. Like BonJour’s, it can be seen as 
a sequence of two arguments. The first is Klein’s trilemma argument: if Fred wants to avoid 
unacceptable arbitrariness, he must oblige Doris’s demand for a meta-justification and explain 
why he takes EDOG to be truth-conducive. According to the second argument, defending the 
truth-conduciveness of EDOG is incompatible with BDOG’s being basic:  
Klein’s Meta-Justification Argument Against Basic Beliefs   
(1) Fred asserts MJ: EDOG has the property of being a clear and vivid visual 
experience, and beliefs based on such experiences are probably true.  
(2) If Fred asserts MJ, then BDOG is not basic.  
Therefore: 
(3) EDOG is not basic. 
Why think that (2) is true? Klein might say that, by asserting MJ, Fred concedes that BDOG is in 
part justified by three additional beliefs: (i) EDOG is a reason for BDOG, (ii) EDOG is a clear and vivid 
visual experience, and (iii) clear and vivid visual experiences are truth-conducive. Now, it would 
indeed be odd of Fred to tell Doris that, even though he responds to her request for a meta-
justification by offering (i)-(iii), he doesn’t really believe these propositions. Here, Klein’s 
trilemma argument applies. If Fred didn’t believe (i)-(iii), he would be guilty of an unacceptable 
kind of epistemic irrationality. However, from the fact that Fred believes (i)-(iii) after Doris’s 
request for a meta-justification, it doesn’t follow that he already had these beliefs before Doris’s 
request. Let’s distinguish between two times: tbefore and tafter. The former is the time-period 
between the formation of BDOG and Doris’s request for a meta-justification. The latter is the 
period during which the dialogue takes place. At tbefore, Fred did not yet have the meta-
justificatory beliefs (i)-(iii). So, Fred can reasonably claim that, at tbefore, BDOG was basic: justified 
without receiving its justification from any further beliefs. Hence, even if Klein succeeded in 
showing that, at tafter, BDOG isn’t basic, his argument wouldn’t show that BDOG wasn’t basic at 
tbefore.18 
Alternatively, Klein might defend premise (2) by endorsing the evidentialist reading of the 
principle of meta-justification. He might argue that, when Fred asserts MJ, he admits that, in 
addition to EDOG, he has further reasons—not beliefs but experiences—from which his 
justification for BDOG derives. If that is what Klein were to say, I would be in fundamental 
agreement with him. However, from the premise that 
 
18 It is not obvious that that BDOG isn’t basic even at tafter. Fred’s justification for BDOG does not depend on 
providing Doris, or anybody for that matter, with an argument for why EDOG is a reason for BDOG. Hence, if 
foundationalists define basic beliefs in the way I have in this paper, BDOG remains basic even after Fred has 
provided Doris with a meta-justification for it.  
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Fred’s justification for BDOG doesn’t come from EDOG alone but derives from additional 
perceptual, introspective, memorial, and intuitional experiences  
we don’t get the conclusion that BDOG isn’t basic. We get that conclusion only if the need for 
meta-justification requires at least one meta-justificatory belief. The evidential reading of the 
principle of meta-justification doesn’t require any such belief. Appealing to EMJ is not, therefore, 
an effective way of arguing against the possibility of basic beliefs. 
Although I do not think Klein’s reasoning against foundationalism succeeds, I nevertheless 
think it supports an important and rather significant conclusion. What the dialogue between 
Doris and Fred shows is that the need for meta-justification is not easily dismissed. In other 
words, Klein’s argument provides strong support for EMJ: the evidential interpretation of the 
principle that there is no justification without meta-justification. But if EMJ is true, then what 
follows isn’t that foundationalism is wrong. Rather, what then follows is that dogmatic 
foundationalism is wrong.  
 
Meta-Justification and Dogmatic Foundationalism 
Michael Huemer and Jim Pryor have defended versions of foundationalism that are versions of a 
view that is now called dogmatism.19 According to this view, having an experience as of p is 
sufficient for having defeasible justification for believing p.20 Having a meta-justification—a 
reason for thinking that the experience as of p is a reason for believing p—is not needed. The 
hallmark of dogmatic foundationalism, then, is the rejection of the principle of meta-justification 
in any form. About Fred’s belief that the dog is on the couch, dogmatists would say that what 
confers justification on BDOG is one and only one thing: EDOG. When responding to Doris’s 
request for a meta-justification, Fred might assert  
MJ EDOG has the property of being a vivid and clear visual experience, and beliefs 
based on such experiences are probably true. 
But, dogmatists would say, Fred’s justification for BDOG depends neither on his believing MJ, nor 
on his having evidence for MJ in the form of additional perceptual, introspective, memorial, or 
intuitional experiences.21  
Klein’s objection to foundationalism is based on the premise that, if Fred doesn’t accede to 
Doris’s demand for a meta-justification, the result is a kind of arbitrariness that is inconsistent 
 
19 See Pryor 2000 and Huemer 2001. Huemer calls his view ‘phenomenal conservatism’, but it is essentially 
the same view Pryor defends. In the Klein-Ginet debate on infinitism, Ginet too defends dogmatic 
foundationalism. See Ginet 2014a, p. 285f.  
20 For a proper understanding of this claim, it is essential to bear in mind the difference between 
propositional and doxastic justification. The claim is not, using the example of Fred’s belief, that EDOG is 
sufficient for Fred’s belief to be justified. Rather, the claim is that EDOG is sufficient for Fred to have 
justification for believing that the dog is on the couch. If EDOG is defeated (perhaps because Fred knows he 
has a brain lesion causing frequent dog hallucinations), then, according to dogmatic foundationalism, Fred 
has justification for believing the dog is on the couch while, at the same time, if Fred were to believe the 
dog is on the couch, his belief would not be justified. Here are two passages showing that, according to 
Huemer and Pryor, an experience as of p is sufficient for having defeasible justification for believing p. 
Huemer: “If it seems to S as if P, then S thereby has at least prima facie justification for believing that P.” 
(2001, p. 99.) Pryor: “My view is that whenever you have an experience as of p, you thereby have immediate 
prima facie justification for believing p.” (Pryor 2000, p. 536). 
21 See Ginet 2014a, p. 296.  
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with Fred’s claim that, as a justified belief, BDOG is probably true. Now, while none of Klein’s 
arguments suggest that he endorses the doxastic reading of the principle of meta-justification, 
DMJ, his argument against foundationalism clearly indicates that he accepts the evidential 
version of the principle: EMJ. This principle delivers exactly what Klein demands: If BDOG is indeed 
justified, then Fred has evidence available to him—in the form of suitable experiences—to 
which, when Doris goes meta, he can appeal to justify his claim that EDOG is a reason for BDOG. 
According to dogmatic foundationalism, Fred’s justification for BDOG doesn’t require such 
evidence. If Klein is right and Fred’s belief isn’t justified unless Fred has available to him reasons 
for the meta-justification Doris demands, then dogmatic foundationalism is mistaken. So, Klein’s 
argument against foundationalism is really an argument against dogmatic foundationalism. And 
on this score, I find myself in complete agreement with him. I think Klein is right in insisting that 
first-order justification requires the possession of reasons that a subject can appeal to when, in a 
dialogue like the one between Fred and Doris, a meta-justification is requested. And I do not 
think Klein would want to insist that this requirement is doxastic: that first-order justification 
requires meta-justificatory beliefs. It seems to me, therefore, that Klein should reject dogmatic 
foundationalism, but not non-dogmatic foundationalism.  
Oddly, in responding to Ginet’s claim that a visual experience can by itself justify the 
corresponding visual belief, Klein appears to concede as much, in effect endorsing dogmatic 
foundationalism.22 Klein agrees with Ginet that visual experience can confer some degree of 
autonomous justification for the corresponding visual belief. My response to this concession is 
twofold. First, I think Klein is right in accepting that visual experience can be a source of 
justification, for otherwise he’d be endorsing the highly problematic circle-of-belief thesis. 
Second, I do not think he should agree that a visual experience can be a source of at least some 
degree of autonomous justification. By ‘autonomous’ justification, Klein means the kind of 
justification for a visual belief that does not require reasons for thinking that the visual 
experience makes the visual belief probable. His response to Ginet is that the infinitist does not 
deny the possibility of autonomous justification, but instead insist that a subject has stronger 
justification for a visual belief if she has reasons for the truth-conduciveness of the 
corresponding visual experience. It seems to me this response gives up too much. It concedes 
that infinitism is correct only as an account of how to increase already existing justification that 
is in no need of meta-justification at all. This is an odd concession because it conflicts with the 
basic point that, if BDOG is justified, then Fred must possess whatever evidence is needed for 
meeting Doris’s demand for meta-justification. 
I suppose the motivation for Klein’s concession arises from the need to respond to the finite 
mind objection to infinitism. If infinitism is the view that Fred’s justification for BDOG requires an 
infinite number of reasons in support of Fred’s belief, then infinitism conflicts with the fact that 
Fred’s mind is finite and therefore incapable of holding an infinite number of reasons. To avoid 
this conflict, Klein says infinitism demands merely the availability of an infinite number of 
reasons.23 But what does availability amount to? The challenge is obvious: if construed too 
stringently, infinitism succumbs to the finite mind objection; if construed too loosely, it’s difficult 
 
22 See Ginet 2014a, p. 285f, and Klein 2014b, p. 292.  
23 Klein 2014a, p. 279.  
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to see why meta-justificatory reasons are necessary at all. Klein sheds some light on the 
meaning of ‘available’ by saying that, for reasons to be available at a given time t, they “must be 
appropriately “hooked up” to S’s beliefs and other mental contents at t,” and he emphasizes 
that, for a reason to be available in this sense, it needn’t be an occurrently held belief.24 
However, are the meta-reasons that Klein thinks justification requires—that is, the reasons Fred 
needs if he is to meet Doris’s demand for a meta-justification—available to Fred if he has no 
evidence at all for taking EDOG to be truth-conducive? I think not.  
There is one and only one way in which the needed reasons are available to Fred: before the 
conversation with Doris begins, he must already be in possession of evidence for the truth-
conduciveness of clear and vivid visual experiences. If Klein agrees with this, he should deny that 
visual experiences can confer any degree of autonomous justification.  
 
Infinitism, Inference, and the Creation Problem  
Klein defends infinitism by arguing that non-inferential justification—a belief’s being basic—is 
impossible. Hence, Carl Ginet points out, infinitism as defended by Klein is the view that all 
justification is inferential.25 Klein agrees.26 However, I do not think that, qua being an infinitist, 
Klein is committed to the claim that non-inferential justification is impossible. Suppose Fred’s 
justification for BDOG does indeed come from a large set of experiential states that originate in 
perception, introspection, memory, and intuition. Let’s suppose this series is at least potentially 
infinite. Each time Fred attempts to give a reason in response to Doris’s recurring requests for 
justification, a new experiential state is formed and supplies Fred with a further reason. Suppose, 
if Fred were a being with an infinite amount of time and patience, he could go on forever 
obliging Doris with further reasons. Would it follow that all justification is inferential? It doesn’t 
seem to me it would. 
Consider again Fred’s belief at tbefore. If infinitism as just outlined is correct, then Fred’s 
justification at tbefore for BDOG comes from a finite set of experiences to which Fred, if he had an 
infinite amount of time, could add infinitely many further experiences.27 Why should we think 
that, because of that possibility, Fred’s justification for BDOG at tbefore is inferential? From the fact 
that, at tbefore, Fred has reasons for the premises of (perhaps infinitely many) meta-justificatory 
arguments, it doesn’t follow that, at tbefore, he has silently rehearsed or verbally articulated any of 
these arguments. It’s one thing to have reasons for the premises of meta-justificatory 
arguments, and it’s another to articulate these arguments and infer their conclusions. While Fred 
offers some such arguments at tafter, he entertained none at tbefore. At that time, his justification 
for BDOG was not the result of inference. Hence, even if infinitism were true, it wouldn’t follow 
that all justification is inferential.28  
 
24 Ibid.  
25 Ginet 2014a, p. 284.  
26 Klein 2014b, p. 294. In his 2010, p. 161, Klein says: “In other words, infinitism holds that all propositional 
knowledge is inferential.”  
27 At each of these times, the number of his experiences would still be finite. And, we might add, the 
number of Fred’s presently occurring experiential states might not swell excessively because, with the 
passage of time, some previously held experiential states will no longer obtain.  
28 It might be objected that Fred’s justification for BDOG is in inferential because it involves premises for a 
series of TIP arguments. This objection would be based on an odd understanding of ‘inferential’. If BDOG is 
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I have argued that infinitism doesn’t entail that all justification is inferential. Nevertheless, 
Klein claims it does. On behalf of foundationalism, Ginet points out that, citing Jonathan Dancy, 
if all justification is indeed inferential, then justification is impossible because inference does not 
create justification. It merely transfers it.29 Klein replies that justification emerges “when the set 
of propositions that are appropriately adduced as reasons expands.”30 The thought is that 
justification begins emerging when the number of inferences has reached critical mass, and that 
its degree increases the more inferences are piled onto each other. Here I agree with Ginet and 
Dancy. I can’t find any plausibility in the claim that justification emerges from inferences alone, 
provided there are enough of them. If all justification were indeed inferential, then it would be 
utterly unclear where Fred’s justification for BDOG comes from at tbefore, because at that time he 
hasn’t yet made any inferences that bear on the justification of his belief that the dog is on the 
couch.  
Can Klein remain an infinitist but allow for the possibility of non-inferential justification? I 
have argued that he can. His primary commitment, I take it, is to the principle of evidential 
meta-justification. When Doris demands from Fred a reason for thinking that EDOG is a reason for 
BDOG, she is asking a legitimate question, and it would be irrational of Fred to say he can’t or 
won’t answer it. But, as I have argued above, advocating the principle of evidential meta-
justification is compatible with BDOG’s being basic or non-inferentially justified. What it is not 
compatible with it is dogmatic foundationalism, according to which EDOG alone justifies BDOG. 
Now, according to non-dogmatic foundationalism, how is Fred’s justification for BDOG created? 
In a nutshell, it is created by reasons for taking EDOG to be a reliable or trustworthy belief 
source—put differently, by reasons for believing that basing BDOG on EDOG is a truth-conducive 
way of forming a belief. This, it seems to me, is the correct answer to the question of how 
justification is created.31 It seems to me as well that this answer is compatible with infinitism. 
What matters is the content of the reasons, not how many there are. If we are to have 
justification for our beliefs, our reasons must include reasons for the truth-conduciveness of our 
belief sources. Reasons of this kind create justification for our beliefs. Whether their number is 
finite or infinite doesn’t matter in this regard.  
 
Infinity and the Argumentative Regress  
Since Klein thinks neither foundationalism nor coherentism are viable solutions to the regress 
problem, he recommends infinitism as the only workable solution. However, exactly which type 
of regress—the doxastic, evidential, or argumentative—is supposed to be infinite? Clearly not 
the first. Klein, I take it, would readily agree that finite minds cannot have an infinite number of 
beliefs. When people infer one belief from one or more further beliefs, the set of beliefs this 
regress consists of is finite, not infinite.  
Suppose non-dogmatic foundationalism is correct. Fred’s justification for BDOG comes from 
EDOG and additional experiential states that are Fred’s reasons for taking EDOG to be truth-
 
justified without being inferred from at least one other belief, then I don’t think there is a basis for claiming 
its justification is inferential.  
29 See Ginet 2014a, p. 290 and Dancy 1985, p. 50. 
30 Klein 2014b, p. 294. 
31 For a defense of this view, see Steup 2004 and Steup forthcoming.  
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conducive. Is it plausible to claim that Fred’s justification for BDOG comes from an infinite set of 
such states? I think what applies to beliefs applies to experiences as well. At a given time, 
subjects don’t have an infinite set of experiential states. But when, prompted by Doris’s request 
for a meta-justification, Fred starts contemplating what might justify him in believing that EDOG is 
a reason for BDOG, then, Klein might argue, a new experiential state might arise each time Fred 
moves along a further step in the regress of giving reasons. The number of such potential 
experiential states might in principle be infinite. I will explore this possibility further below.  
Now consider the argumentative regress. In practice, it cannot be infinite. Sooner or later 
other pressing matters, like getting a good night’s sleep, will put a stop to Fred’s attempts to 
oblige Doris. Klein might reply that, if we have access to a potentially infinite amount of meta-
justificatory reasons, then, if Fred and Doris were beings with an infinite amount of time, they 
could carry on their dialogue forever. And this seems to follow from two premises to which Klein 
appeals and which I myself find rather plausible: 
P1 Each time Fred supplies Doris with a further reason, it is legitimate for Doris to 
ask Fred what it is that justifies him in asserting this reason. 
P2 Each time Doris asks Fred to justify the reason he just offered, it would be 
irrational for Fred—inconsistent with his starting point that BDOG is justified—to 
reply that he doesn’t have a reason.   
If P1 and P2 are true, then the conclusion that at the argumentative regress is indeed infinite, at 
least in principle, seems inescapable.  
Of course, in the practice, the activity of reason giving is bound to come to an end 
eventually. But that’s consistent with the main point: if P1 and P2 are correct, then the 
argumentative regress could go on forever at least in principle. Ginet demurs. He says it’s one 
thing to claim that there is an at least in principle available infinite series of reasons, and it’s 
another thing to give an example of such a regress or at least an algorithm for generating one.32 
Ginet’s request for an example or an algorithm is fair. In the next section, I’ll attempt to spell out 
what’s going on when, after Doris went meta, the dialogue between her and Fred continues for 
some distance.  
 
The Introspective Track  
Let us review what ensues when Doris goes meta. Fred claims his reason for BDOG is EDOG. Doris 
makes the meta move by asking Fred why he thinks EDOG is a reason for BDOG, or, put differently, 
why he thinks that EDOG makes it likely that BDOG is true. Fred replies that EDOG has the following 
property: it is a clear and vivid visual experience. In effect, he offers a TIP Argument: 
A1 
(1) BDOG originates in EDOG: a clear and vivid visual experience.  
(2) Visual experiences of this type are reliable. 
Therefore: 
 
32 See Ginet 2014a, p. 290. He writes: “To make it plausible that there actually occur justifications having 
the endlessly ramifying structure that infinitism says all justifications must have, the infinitist must provide 
representative examples of particular such structures possessed by cognitively normal human subjects, 
examples about which it would be credible that cases essentially like them actually occur.” 
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(3) BDOG is probably true.  
Doris can now choose between three different tracks of moving the regress forward: She can ask 
Fred for a reason in support of (1), for a reason in support of (2), and finally for a reason in 
support of why Fred thinks that that (3) follows from (1) and (2). I will discuss the first two of 
these.33  
If Doris asks Fred to justify premise (1) of A1, she starts the introspective track. Fred will 
respond by offering a second TIP argument:  
AIN1 
(1) I am, in a way that’s clear and vivid, introspectively aware that EDOG is a clear and 
vivid visual experience.34  
(2) Introspective experiences of this type are reliable.  
Therefore: 
(3) Its highly likely that premise (1) of A1 is true.  
Suppose Doris next asks Fred to justify premise (1) of AIN1. Since Fred knows this premise 
through introspection, he will offer an argument that repeats the reasoning of AIN1:  
AIN2 
(1) My reason for (1) of AIN1 is clear and vivid introspection. 
(2) Introspective experiences of this type are reliable.  
Therefore: 
(3) Premise (1) of AIN1 is probably true.  
Suppose Doris carries on and says to Fred: “You just presented me with a new argument: AIN2. 
This argument has two premises each of which requires a reason. Please give me your reason for 
the first premise of AIN2.” Well, what is Fred’s reason for claiming he knows through 
introspection that his knowledge of what is visual experience is like originates in introspection? 
There is only one thing Fred can say, namely: “I know this through introspection.” Hence, to 
defend premise (1) of AIN2, he will offer this argument:  
AIN3 
(1) My reason for (1) of AIN2 is clear and vivid introspection. 
(2) Introspective experiences of this type are reliable.  
Therefore: 
(3) Premise (1) of AIN2 is probably true.  
AIN2 and AIN3 are identical except for one difference: the first premise of AIN2 refers to the first 
premise of AIN1, and the first premise of AIN3 refers to the first premise of AIN2. If Doris asks Fred 
to justify the first premise of AIN3, Fred will repeat the previously given argument, and if Doris 
ask Fred to justify the first premise of this further argument, he will again repeat the previously 
given argument, and so forth. 
 
33 I’ll trust readers can easily apply the results of my discussion to the regress that ensues when Doris ask 
Fred to justify his assumption that the premises of A1 support the conclusion of A1.  
34 I’m simplifying a bit. As far as premise (1) of the initial TIP argument, A1, is concerned, Doris can focus on 
two different questions. She might ask Fred how he knows BDOG is based on (originates in) EDOG, and how 
he know that EDOG is a clear and vivid visual experience. I discuss what happens if she asks the second of 
these questions. The structure of unfolding series of arguments will be the same for the regress that would 
ensue if Doris were instead to ask the first of these questions. 
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Two things are now perfectly clear. First, this pattern is in principle infinite. Second, if Doris 
and Fred are reasonable, they will recognize that further pursuit of this regress is pointless: it will 
not deepen their understanding of why Fred is justified in believing, or how he knows, that EDOG: 
a clear and vivid visual experience. The basic point is that he has introspective awareness of 
what is visual experience is like, and that he is introspectively aware of his introspective 
awareness. Therefore, although the introspective track of the regress could in principle carry on 
endlessly, it ceases to produce further justificational juice, which amounts to a kind of 
termination.35 
 
The Nature of Introspective Awareness  
It might be objected that the introspective track reveals the following: if Fred’s justification for 
BDOG requires that he have reasons supporting the premises of the initial TIP argument, A1, then 
the following vicious regress ensues. It must be that Fred: 
1.  has clear and vivid introspective awareness that EDOG is a clear and vivid visual 
experience, 
2. has clear and vivid introspective awareness that he has clear and vivid 
introspective awareness that EDOG is a clear and vivid visual experience,  
3. has clear and vivid introspective awareness that he has clear and vivid 
introspective awareness that he has clear and vivid introspective awareness that 
EDOG is a clear and vivid visual experience 
and so forth. In short, for Fred to have justification for premise (1) of A1, he must have an 
infinite series of layers of introspective meta-awareness. As a finite mind, Fred is not capable of 
such a feat. Hence, the principle of evidential meta-justification has the consequence that Fred’s 
belief about the nature of EDOG cannot be justified.  
There is a straightforward response to this worry. Introspective awareness is, as Roderick 
Chisholm would have put it, self-presenting: it comes with introspective awareness of itself. To 
know I’m introspecting, I don’t need to meta-introspect. For example, when I have a headache, I 
know I do because I can feel it. Feeling my headache has awareness built into it. Likewise, when 
Fred is introspectively aware that he is having a visual experience of the dog—as opposed to an 
auditory, tactile, or olfactory one—that introspective awareness is self-presenting. Fred does not 
need an additional introspection to know he is introspectively aware of what kind of an 
experience EDOG is.  
Let’s review. When Doris ask Fred how he knows EDOG is a clear and vivid visual experience, 
Fred replies that he knows this through introspection. When Doris asks him how he knows that 
he knows this through introspection, he will say: “I’m introspectively aware that I’m 
introspectively aware of it.” Doris might now say: “And how do you know that?” To answer this 
question, Fred need only repeat his previous answer.  
 
35 Doris might ask Fred why he takes himself to know that clear and vivid introspective experiences are 
truth-conducive. His reply should be that he remembers that they are. For the sake of illustration, he might 
say, for example, that he doesn’t remember any situations in which he thought he was seeing a dog when 
it turned out that he was not seeing a dog but smelling one (or hearing one, or feeling one with his hands.) 
Put differently, memory tells us that we are highly reliable in identifying a specific perceptual experience as 
visual, auditory, tactile, or olfactory. 
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The Memorial Track  
Now suppose Doris next asks Fred to justify the second premise of A1, his initial meta-
justificatory argument:  
(2) Clear and vivid visual experiences are reliable. 
Fred replies that he remembers that visual experience of this type produce nearly always true 
beliefs and thus offers the following argument:  
AME1 
(1) I have a clear and vivid memory that clear and vivid visual experiences are 
reliable.36  
(2) Clear and vivid memories are reliable.  
Therefore: 
(3) It’s highly likely true that my clear and vivid visual experiences are reliable.  
Carrying on, Doris asks Fred to justify the second premise of AME1. That is, she asks Fred to 
explain how he knows that clear and vivid memorial experiences are reliable. Fred answers that 
he remembers that and proceeds to give the following argument:  
AME2   
(1) I have a clear and vivid memory that clear and vivid memories are reliable.  
(2) Clear and vivid memories are reliable.  
Therefore: 
(3) It’s highly likely true that clear and vivid memories are reliable.  
As Doris did when she and Fred were on the introspective track, she might now say to him: “You 
just presented me with a new argument: AME2. This argument has two premises each of which 
requires a reason. Please give me your reason for premise (2) of this argument.” Here is Fred’s 
response:  
AME3   
(1) I have a clear and vivid memory that clear and vivid memories are reliable.  
(2) Clear and vivid memories are reliable.  
Therefore: 
(3) It’s highly likely true that clear and vivid memories are reliable.  
AME2 and AME3 are two tokens of the same type. Fred’s giving AME2 is one speech act, his giving 
AME3 is another. But in giving AME3, Fred isn’t saying anything new. Although Doris and Fred 
could in principle go on forever, nothing of value will henceforth be achieved. What is of 
epistemic value has already been captured: Fred knows through memory that clear and vivid 
visual experiences are reliable, and he knows through memory that clear and vivid memorial 
 
36 If Doris were to challenge this premise, a regress along the introspective track would ensue. Its structure 
would replicate the regress discussed in the previous section.  
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experiences are reliable.37 If Doris is reasonable, she will abstain from asking Fred again to justify 
premise (2) of AME3, consider the matter closed, and buy him a drink.38  
 
The Five Stages of the Justificational Regress 
One of Ginet’s objections to Klein’s infinitism concerns the content of the allegedly infinite 
regress. He asks for an illustration of what’s going when Doris and Fred continue traversing the 
allegedly infinite regress for at least some distance. In the previous two sections, I have taken 
Ginet’s request seriously and examined what ensues when Doris and Fred carry on for quite a 
while. A noteworthy outcome presented itself: paradoxically, although the argumentative 
regress is in principle infinite, there is nevertheless a clear sense in which it terminates in its final 
stage. Let’s review the overall structure of the argumentative regress: 
Stage 1:  Fred asserts that the dog ate the cookie. When Doris asks him to justify this belief, he 
mentions three further propositions: the dog is on the couch, looks guilty, and Fred’s 
cookie is gone. This is the doxastic stage.  
Stage 2:  When Doris asks him to justify his belief that the dog is on the couch, Fred might say 
what is clearly a proper response: “I can see it.” Since he is an experiential 
foundationalist, he expresses this point by saying that he has a visual experience as 
though the dog is on the couch. This the experiential grounding stage. 
Stage 3:  When Doris goes meta and asks Fred why he takes EDOG to be a reason for BDOG, he 
offers an initial TIP argument: EDOG is a clear and vivid visual experience, and such 
experiences are truth-conducive. This the initial meta stage. 
Stage 4:  Next, the regress branches into two tracks. Initiating the introspective track, Doris asks 
Fred to justify his claim that EDOG is a clear and vivid visual experience. In response, 
Fred offers two further TIP arguments: AIN1 and AIN2. Initiating the memorial regress, 
Doris ask Fred to justify his claim that clear and vivid memorial experiences are truth-
conducive. In response, Fred offers another pair of TIP arguments: AME1 and AME2. This 
is the supplementary meta stage.   
Stage 5:  Doris points out that there is an algorithm for generating an infinite number of 
additional TIP arguments. She might say: “Fred, you just used four supplementary TIP 
arguments with two premises each to justify the two premises of your initial TIP 
argument. Therefore, you owe me eight more arguments to justify the premises of 
your supplementary TIP arguments. Once you have provided them, you will owe me 
sixteen more arguments, and then thirty-two arguments, so forth. Alas, I agree with 
you that, in providing me with these arguments, you will only repeat the main 
thought you already expressed, namely that introspection tells you what you 
 
37 Some epistemologists would strenuously object that it’s irrational to attempt to justify the reliability of 
memory by using memory itself. See, for example, Fumerton 1995, p. 177. He says: “You cannot use 
perception to justify the reliability of perception! You cannot use memory to justify the reliability of 
memory! You cannot use induction to justify the reliability of induction! Such attempts . . .  involve blatant, 
indeed pathetic, circularity.” See also Alston 1993. I’m not persuaded by the objection that using our 
faculties to establish the reliability of our faculties involves vicious circularity. See Steup 2013.  
38 If Doris were to ask Fred to justify why he thinks A1’s conclusion follows from A1’s premises, she would 
trigger a regress along an intuitional track. Its structure would replicate that of the introspective and 
memorial tracks.  
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experience, introspect, and remember, and that memory tells you that your clear and 
vivid perceptual, introspective, and memorial experiences are reliable. Given all that, I 
agree you have provided me with a satisfying defense of your claim that EDOG is a 
reason for BDOG, and ultimately with a complete justification of your assertion that the 
dog ate your cookie. Well done, Fred.” This is the stage of vacuous infinity.  
The justificational regress, then, is both finite and infinite. It is finite because, when it comes to 
revealing the flow of genuine justificational juice, stages 2-4—the experiential grounding, the 
initial TIP argument, and two rounds of supplementary TIP argumentation—do all the work. In 
stage 5, which begins with the third round of defending the two premises of the initial TIP 
argument, further TIP argumentation fails to be productive: it does not identify any additional 
source of justification. The regress now deteriorates into vacuous infinity. This type of infinity is 
benign and does not pose a problem for the claim that Fred is justified in believing that the dog 
is on the couch.   
 
Benign Infinity   
Here is an analogy. Consider the following equation:  






Its truth is not obvious. Now consider the following large square in which each natural number 












2 = 10. 
 
If one looks at the square, one sees that the little squares representing the natural numbers on 
the left side of the equation make up one half of the large square plus one half of n little 
squares, in this case one half of four little squares. As one comprehends this, one intuits that the 
equation works for any value for n. A nagging doubter might suggest drawing a square for n = 
5 to see whether we get the same result, and then a square for n = 6, just to make sure, and so 
forth. Obviously, nothing will be accomplished by carrying on. Two conclusions follow. First, the 
initial intuition triggered by looking at the diagram is sufficient for understanding why the 
equation is true. Considering additional squares is pointless. It will not deepen our 
understanding. Second, since the equation is true for any n, it has an infinite number of 
 




instances. Such infinity is benign. The fact that there is an infinite number of instances, and the 
fact that as finite minds we could not comprehend the actual propositions stating the equations 
for extremely large values of n does not limit at all our understanding of the equation’s truth.  
Let’s return to the dialogue between Fred and Doris. When Fred says he introspects that 
EDOG is a clear and vivid visual experience, Doris can ask him how he knows that. Fred will reply 
he introspects that is introspecting this. Doris can ask him again how he knows this. Fred can say 
again that he is introspecting that he is introspecting. It seems clear Doris and Fred can carry on 
endlessly moving in this circle. It is equally clear that doing so is pointless, and that the infinity 
involved is benign. It doesn’t threaten Fred’s initial claim that he knows through introspection 
he’s having a clear and vivid visual experience.  
The same can be said for the memorial track. When Fred says he remembers that clear and 
vivid visual experiences are truth-conducive, Doris will demand a justification. Fred will reply that 
he knows this because of a clear and vivid memory, and that such memories are truth-
conducive. If Doris continues asking Fred for a reason, he will say that he knows through 
memory that clear and vivid memories are truth conducive. If Doris continues pressing Fred for a 
reason, they’ll start moving in circles. If they had an infinite amount of time, they could carry on 
in this fashion forever. Again, two things are clear: Carrying on would be pointless, and the 
involved infinity poses no threat to Fred’s claim that what he remembers about his clear and 
vivid visual and memorial experiences justifies him in trusting them.  
 
Does the Argumentative Increase Justification? 
I have argued that we must distinguish between two claims. The first is that the argumentative 
regress is in principle infinite. The second is that all justification is inferential. I have also argued 
that the former claim does not entail the latter. Klein, though, thinks it does. Hence Klein needs 
a response to Ginet’s objection that inference cannot create but only transfer justification.40 
Ginet’s point is that infinitism makes it impossible to understand where justification comes from. 
Klein responds by saying that justification emerges as the argumentative regress expands. The 
more reasons are given, the more justification increases. There are three problems with this 
claim. First, as I argued above, this response leaves unexplained why BDOG is already justified at 
tbefore. Second, it makes the justification of our beliefs dependent on the activity of reason 
giving—a consequence I find utterly implausible. Third, when Fred has completed the 
supplementary meta stage and moves on to stage 5, the argumentative regress deteriorates 
into pointlessness. If Doris continues to press Fred to give further reasons, all he can say is: I 
introspect that I’m introspecting what kind of experiences I have, and my memory tells me that 
basing beliefs on clear and vivid perceptual, introspective, and memorial experiences is truth-
conducive. When this stage is reached and Doris and Fred carry on with the business of reason 
giving, nothing of value will henceforth be achieved. I don’t find it plausible, therefore, that the 
longer the regress lasts, the more justification is generated.  
In fact, I find it doubtful that, by responding to Doris’s continued demands for reasons, Fred 
increases his justification for BDOG to any degree. According to non-dogmatic foundationalism, 
Fred’s belief is justified at tbefore because of: (i) EDOG, (ii) Fred’s clear and vivid introspective 
 
40 See Ginet 2014a, p. 290f. 
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awareness that EDOG is a clear and vivid visual experience, (iii) memorial awareness that clear and 
vivid introspective and visual experiences are truth-conducive, and (iv) memorial awareness that 
clear and vivid memories are truth-conducive. These are reasons Fred already has before his 
dialogue with Doris commences. Obliging Doris’s requests to justify BDOG, Fred does not 
generate new reasons for his belief but merely articulates and makes public the reasons he had 
to begin with. I’m inclined to think, therefore, that the argumentative regress that ensues 
between Doris and Fred does not increase Fred’s justification for BDOG at all. It merely reveals 
where Fred’s justification comes from. 
 
Foundationalist Infinitism 
I conclude by summing up where I agree and where I disagree with Klein’s infinitism. First and 
most fundamentally, I agree with Klein that justification requires meta-justification. Second, I 
agree with Klein that the argumentative regress is in principle infinite. Third, I agree with Klein 
that the infinity involved is benign. However, and here my disagreement with Klein begins, the 
infinity in question is benign not because, as Klein suggests, it is merely an infinity of potential 
reasons. Rather, it is benign because an argumentative regress that infinite beings might carry 
on forever ceases at stage 5 to produce any new reasons. It merely repeats previously stated 
reasons. The potential infinity of the argumentative regress does not, therefore, require an 
infinite amount of reasons. 
Second, I disagree with Klein’s claim that the longer the regress continues, the more 
justification is produced. I claim instead that, if BDOG is justified to begin with, then Fred must 
have, prior to his dialogue with Doris, all the reasons needed for complete meta-justification. 
Due to these reasons, Fred’s belief is fully justified. It does not gain additional justification when 
Fred, prompted by Doris, uses these reasons to provide meta-justification for BDOG.  
Third, I disagree with Klein’s claim that justification is created through inference. Fred’s 
belief was already completely justified before Doris and Fred began their dialogue. At that time, 
BDOG was justified non-inferentially: not by any inferences but instead by Fred’s initial visual 
experience, EDOG, and the various introspective and memorial states providing him with the 
reasons for the reliability of EDOG. I do not, therefore, see a necessary conflict between 
foundationalism and infinitism. However, infinitism isn’t compatible with just any form of 
foundationalism. Infinitism results from the principle of meta-justification. Dogmatic 
foundationalism rejects this principle. Hence, I strongly suspect Klein rejects dogmatism. If he 
does, I find myself again in agreement with him. If dogmatism is true, there can be justification 
without meta-justification. If there can be justification without meta-justification, there will be a 
point when Fred has nothing to show for when Doris ask him to justify his most recent assertion. 
Klein would say that introduces an unacceptable kind of arbitrariness. On that, I couldn’t agree 
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